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ABSTRACT
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 established the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program within the United States. TANF
mandated 60-month lifetime time limits for federal cash assistance dollars. Because states
reserve the right to set their own stricter or more generous time limits, the 60-month lifetime
limit did not bind in all cases. In recent years, however, several states imposed TANF time limits
for the first time or made existing time limits more stringent. Using administrative and survey
data, I find that stricter time limits decrease annual TANF participation by 22 percent and annual
transfer income by 6 percent. Consistent with binding TANF work requirements, widespread
unemployment, and increases in employment among those on the welfare caseload, stricter time
limits do not tend to increase employment or earnings among single mothers in states without
generous TANF programs at baseline. Evidence suggests that macroeconomic conditions and the
labor market potential of TANF recipients play large roles in determining labor-supply effects of
decreased TANF generosity.
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1.

Introduction

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) established the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program within the United States.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of TANF was that it mandated 60-month lifetime time limits
for federal cash assistance dollars. States, however, reserve the right to set stricter time limits or to
continue to fund TANF caseloads beyond 60 months using their own funds. Earlier work on time
limits, in which the authors of those earlier papers estimate the effects of welfare reform, suggests
that states’ introduction of time-limit policies decreases welfare use;1 increases employment;2 and
decreases participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly the
Food Stamp Program.3
In the wake of the Great Recession, several states have imposed TANF time limits for the first
time or made existing time limits more stringent. I find that stricter time limits decrease annual
TANF participation by 22 percent and annual transfer income by 6 percent among single prime-age
female heads of household with children and without college degrees. Consistent with binding
TANF work requirements, widespread unemployment, and increases in employment among those
on the welfare caseload over time, stricter time limits do not tend to increase employment or
earnings among single mothers in states without generous TANF programs at baseline. Evidence
suggests that macroeconomic conditions and the labor market potential of TANF recipients play
large roles in determining labor-supply effects of decreased TANF generosity.
I am the first to study time-limit policies implemented since 2003, which differ from the policies
examined in earlier time-limit studies for several reasons. First, unlike time limits implemented
circa 1996, more recent changes were not associated with other major welfare policy reforms,
allowing me to isolate the effects of time-limit policies. Second, unlike the earlier time limits,
the recent reforms counted families’ existing months on welfare, so families beyond the time limit
could lose eligibility and access immediately, which I refer to as a “mechanical” loss of eligibility.
1See Grogger (2002, 2003, 2004), Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003), Fang and Keane (2004), Swann (2005),
Farrell et al. (2008), Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008), Fang and Silverman (2009), Mazzolari and Ragusa (2012), Chan
(2013, 2017, 2018), and Low et al. (2018).
2See Grogger (2003), Fang and Keane (2004), Swann (2005), Farrell et al. (2008), Fang and Silverman (2009),
Mazzolari and Ragusa (2012), Chan (2013, 2017), and Low et al. (2018).
3See Mazzolari and Ragusa (2012), Chan (2013), and Low et al. (2018).
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Third, there are substantial macroeconomic differences and, therefore, differences in labor market
opportunities between the 1990s and 2010s, which could lead to different effects of time-limit
policies over time. Finally, the welfare caseload composition changed considerably between the
1990s and 2010s as PRWORA linked welfare to work and was wildly successful in decreasing
welfare participation. Changes in the characteristics of those on the welfare caseload may also lead
to differences in policy effects.
In the following section, I provide institutional details about the TANF policy environments.
In Section 3, I present a conceptual framework for the effects of TANF time limits on access
to financial resources. In Section 4, I describe the data. In Sections 5 and 6, I analyze TANF
participation and other outcomes related to access to financial resources, respectively. In Section
7, I interpret results and discuss possible channels through which they may operate. In the eighth
and final section, I conclude.

2.

Background

TANF is a means-tested cash transfer program for families with children. The income, assets, and
size of the assistance unit—children and any adults who care for them—determine households’
eligibility for monthly cash assistance.4 States set all policy parameters and administer TANF
payments but receive about half their funding from the federal government if they meet spending
requirements and have specified portions of their TANF caseloads engaged in work-related activities,
such as employment and job training. States can use these federal TANF dollars to fund TANF
cases with adults in the assistance unit who have received assistance for 60 months or fewer, as
well as child-only cases in which children typically live with grandparents or other relatives. In
other words, states may not allocate federal funding to children or adults in households that have
received TANF for 60 months or more.5 States, however, may continue to fund TANF cases beyond
60 months using their own funds or may implement shorter TANF time limits. While a few states
4An adult caretaker lives with the child and makes the majority of decisions regarding that child’s well-being. States
have discretion over whether adults who do not care for children are included in the assistance unit. For instance, some
states include income from grandparents or stepparents living in the household when determining benefit amounts.
5States may use federal dollars to provide extended benefits for up to 20 percent of their average TANF caseload
during times of hardship (Pub. L. 104-193. 110 Stat. 2105 2016). Children may continue to receive TANF benefits if
they leave the household to live with grandparents or other friends or relatives.
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allow all individuals to remain on TANF indefinitely, states more often grant certain groups of
individuals exemptions from or extensions to their time-limit policies. For instance, many states
extend time limits for victims of domestic violence and individuals who are ill or incapacitated.
Table 1 shows that four states, Arizona, Kansas, Maine, and Michigan—henceforth, the “analysis
states”—changed their lifetime TANF time limits for all individuals in the assistance unit between
2010 and 2016. Arizona gradually shortened its time limit from 60 to 12 months between July
2010 and July 2016. Similarly, Kansas, which originally had a 60-month time limit, phased in
a 24-month time limit between November 2011 and July 2016. Maine, which previously had no
time limit, implemented a 60-month time limit in January 2012. And while Michigan formally
established a 48-month time limit in 2007, Michigan’s legislature did not implement this policy
until 2011 and still allowed nearly all TANF cases to receive assistance for 60 months through
time-limit extensions. Therefore, Michigan effectively implemented a 60-month time limit for the
first time in 2011.6 In all of these cases, the new time-limit policies were announced within a year
of their implementation. Individuals who had already reached the states’ new time limits were then
notified. All individuals in assistance units that had reached their time limits, including children,
were removed from the TANF caseload shortly after the time limits were implemented.
6Michigan’s implementation of the 48-month state time limit led to the immediate closure of 0.2 percent of TANF
cases (Carley 2011; Office of Family Assistance, Administration for Children and Families, United States Department
of Health and Human Services 2020).
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Table 1: State TANF Time Limit Policy Changes, 2003–2018
State
Time limit policy change
Month policy enacted Affected individuals
Arizona
60 to 36 months
July 2010
All in assistance unit
Arizona
36 to 24 months
August 2011
All in assistance unit
Arizona
24 to 12 months
July 2016
All in assistance unit
California
60 to 48 months
July 2011
Adults in assistance unit
Kansas
60 to 48 months
November 2011
All in assistance unit
Kansas
48 to 36 months
July 2015
All in assistance unit
Kansas
36 to 24 months
July 2016
All in assistance unit
Maine
None to 60 months
January 2012
All in assistance unit
Michigan
None to 60 months
October 2011
All in assistance unit
Missouri
60 to 45 months
January 2016
All in assistance unit
Oregon
None to 60 months
October 2007
Adults in assistance unit
Rhode Island None to 24 out of 60 months July 2008
All in assistance unit
States that changed their TANF time-limit policies between 2003 and 2018. Information was
retrieved from Urban Institute (2020).

Additionally, Table 1 shows that California, Missouri, Oregon, and Rhode Island changed their
TANF time-limit policies between 2007 and 2016.7 California and Oregon changed their time-limit
policies for adults, but not children, in the assistance unit in 2011 and 2007, respectively. When
TANF cases in these states reach their time limits, adults are removed from the caseload, while
children remain eligible for benefits. Missouri also changed its time limit from 60 to 45 months
in 2016, and Rhode Island implemented an intermittent, not lifetime, time limit in 2008. In this
paper, I focus on the states that changed their lifetime time limits for entire families in the wake of
the Great Recession; my period of study runs from 2007 through 2016. I do not estimate effects of
time-limit policies enacted in 2007 and 2008 in Oregon and Rhode Island, but I do show results for
California’s modified time limit in the online appendix. To compare effects across macroeconomic
environments, in the online appendix I also include results for Missouri, for which I extend the
study period through 2018. I remove Oregon, Rhode Island, California, and Missouri from the
main analyses.8
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the states in Table 1, and the analysis states in particular,
implemented stricter TANF time-limit policies in response to economic difficulties which became
7While Washington formally introduced a stricter TANF time-limit policy in 2011, it continued to allow individuals
who complied with TANF policies to remain on the caseload indefinitely.
8I also remove Illinois from the analyses, as it experienced a budget shortfall in 2012 that caused some TANF
benefit payments to be delayed until 2013.
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particularly pressing in the absence of federal supports after the Great Recession. Specifically,
during Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, states could receive additional federal TANF funds through
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which allocated $5 billion toward
emergency TANF spending (Pub. L. 111-5 2009). But when ARRA appropriations ended in
2011, some state governments found themselves struggling to fund TANF caseloads. In particular,
analysis states were experiencing budget shortfalls as they changed their time-limit policies (Oliff,
Mai, and Palacios 2012). In Arizona’s TANF Caseload Reduction Report for Fiscal Year 2010,
Brewer and Young (2013) explain that the Arizona Department of Economic Security’s budget
was cut by more than 31 percent between the beginning of Fiscal Year 2009 and the end of Fiscal
Year 2010. They claim that additional cuts would have been necessary in the absence of the
ARRA appropriations. Likewise, Michigan forecast nearly $75 million in cost savings due to
time-limit case closures during Fiscal Year 2012 (Carley 2011). In light of this, and given the high
unemployment rates in the wake of the Great Recession, state financial issues, rather than a lack of
need for safety-net benefits, seem to have driven states to change their TANF time limits.
Time limits are not the only margin along which states can influence TANF program design, as
each state sets its own income eligibility requirements, TANF benefits, and work requirements for
recipients. While each of these policies varies to some degree across states, many states implement
similar TANF program rules. For instance, most states, including all of the analysis states, calculate
TANF benefit amounts using the following formula:
(1)

𝑇 𝐴𝑁 𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒 𝑓 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒 𝑓 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑡 (𝑌 − 𝐷), 0},

where 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒 𝑓 𝑖𝑡 is the maximum TANF benefit, a function of family characteristics; 𝑌 is
non-TANF income; 𝐷 ∈ [0, ∞) is the earned income disregard; and 𝑡 ∈ (0, 1] is the benefit
reduction rate. Hence, after some amount of earned income is disregarded, additional income
decreases TANF benefits. Additionally, many states require their TANF recipients without very
young children to engage in work-related activities, such as employment and job training, for at
least 30 hours per week.
Table 2 displays how some state TANF program rules varied across the analysis states and the
rest of the United States between 1999 and 2009. For three-person families, both maximum TANF
5

benefits and maximum income thresholds for eligibility have increased little, if at all, in nominal
terms in each of the analysis states and in the remaining U.S. states on average, suggesting that TANF
has become a less generous program over time. Table 2 also shows that TANF generosity varies
considerably across the analysis states. For instance, as of 2009, the monthly income threshold
for initial TANF eligibility of three-person families was more than $1,000 in Maine but less than
$600 in both Arizona and Kansas. TANF benefit formula parameters differ across analysis states
as well. And while work requirements are fairly similar across analysis states, exemptions from
work requirements for parents of young children differ considerably. Maine, Kansas, and Michigan
exempt parents of children 12, 6, and 3 months or younger, respectively, while Arizona does not
exempt any parents from work requirements on the basis of the age of the child.
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Table 2: State TANF Policies over Time
Time limit

Max income ($)

Max benefit ($)

Earned income disregard ($)

Benefit reduction rate (%)

Work requirement

Child younger than (months)

Arizona

Kansas

Maine

Michigan

Control mean/mode

1999
2004
2009

None
60
60

60
60
60

60
None
None

None
None
None

60
60
60

1999
2004
2009

586
586
585

519
519
519

1,023
1,023
1,023

774
774
815

692
731
777

1999
2004
2009

347
347
278

429
429
429

461
485
485

459
459
492

408
414
400

1999
2004
2009

90
90
90

90
90
90

108
108
108

200
200
200

1999
2004
2009

70
70
70

60
60
60

50
50
50

80
80
80

1999
2004
2009

Case-specific
Case-specific
Case-specific

25
30
30

25
30
30

25
40
30

25
30
30

1999
N/A
12
12
3
12
2004
N/A
12
12
3
12
2009
N/A
6
12
3
12
Policies for nonelderly, nonexempt adults in standard state TANF programs as of July 1999, July
2004, and July 2009. “Time limit” indicates the state’s lifetime time limit. “Max income” indicates
the maximum income level for initial eligibility of three-person families. “Max benefit” indicates
the maximum benefit amount for three-person families. “Earned income disregard” indicates the
state’s earned income disregard for TANF benefits. “Benefit reduction rate” indicates the state’s
benefit reduction rate for TANF benefits. “Work requirement” indicates parental weekly work
requirements. “Child younger than (months)” indicates the age of the child for which parents
are exempt from work requirements. The column “Control mean/mode” displays means across
all states except the analysis states for maximum income and benefits, as well as modes for time
limits, work requirements, and exemptions from work requirements for parents of young children.
Information was retrieved from Urban Institute (2020).

In addition to TANF policies, welfare caseload composition has changed over time as PRWORA
7

led to large decreases in welfare participation and tied welfare receipt to work. Table 3 uses data
from the 1990 census and the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) to show stark differences
between adult welfare recipients with children in 1990 and 2009 (Ruggles et al. 2020).9 On average,
welfare recipients in 2009 are younger and have more children than welfare recipients in 1990. In
addition, welfare recipients in 2009 are 12 percentage points more likely to be employed and earn
about $3,600 (2010 dollars) more annually than welfare recipients did in 1990, in spite of higher
unemployment rates during the Great Recession.
9I limit the sample to welfare recipients with children to eliminate child-only cases. I also restrict the sample to
those with less than $80,000 in earnings to remove outliers from the data.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Welfare Recipients in 1990 and 2009
1990
2009
Difference
Female
0.81
0.80
-0.01
(0.0011)
(0.0041)
{0.0075}
Married
0.30
0.32
0.02
(0.0013)
(0.0049)
{0.0006}
Age
40.61
37.85
-2.76
(0.0483)
(0.1340)
{0.0000}
White
0.49
0.48
-0.01
(0.0014)
(0.0054)
{0.0027}
Black
0.29
0.23
-0.06
(0.0013)
(0.0048)
{0.0000}
Hispanic
0.07
0.12
0.05
(0.0007)
(0.0036)
{0.0000}
Kids
2.10
2.17
0.07
(0.0036)
(0.0137)
{0.0000}
Kids <5
0.56
0.63
0.07
(0.0023)
(0.0092)
{0.0000}
<High school
0.52
0.31
-0.21
(0.0014)
(0.0051)
{0.0000}
High school
0.28
0.31
0.03
(0.0013)
(0.0051)
{0.0000}
>High school
0.20
0.38
0.18
(0.0012)
(0.0053)
{0.0000}
Employed
0.21
0.33
0.12
(0.0012)
(0.0051)
{0.0000}
Earnings
3,690
7,316
3,626
(27)
(128)
{0.0000}
Observations
154,844
12,413
Representative of 3,143,241 1,340,208
Summary statistics for parents who received TANF in 1990 and 2009. “Employed” is an indicator
for work within the past week. “Earnings” indicates annual earnings. Data was retrieved from
the 1990 census and the 2009 ACS using household weights. Standard deviations are listed in
parentheses. 𝑝-values are listed in curly braces.

Under both the 1990s and 2010s environments, the TANF program interacted with other
elements of the safety net. For example, households that receive TANF are categorically eligible
for SNAP, which provides food benefits to needy households. Because of this, TANF recipients need
not apply for SNAP or meet its income and asset requirements. Although virtually all households
that leave TANF remain eligible for SNAP, they must reapply for benefits. While some states,
9

including Arizona and Maine, allow households to maintain categorical SNAP eligibility for up
to five months after leaving TANF through transitional benefits, former TANF recipients in other
states lose SNAP eligibility concurrently with TANF eligibility if they fail to reapply (Food and
Nutrition Service, United States Department of Agriculture 2019b). Transaction costs involved in
SNAP certification are nontrivial, and evidence suggests that they likely prevent take-up among
eligibles (Currie and Grogger 2001; Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio 2003; Ribar, Edelhoch, and
Liu 2008; Homonoff and Somerville 2020), so stricter TANF time-limit policies likely disconnect
households from SNAP, decreasing their access to financial resources.10
In existing work, authors also find that decreased welfare generosity is associated with increased
participation in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program (Kubik 1999; Bowen and Glied
2000; Schmidt and Sevak 2004). SSI is a means-tested federal transfer program that provides
cash and Medicaid benefits to low-income individuals who are 65 years of age or older, blind, or
disabled. Unlike TANF, SSI is administered at the individual level, and there are no time limits or
work requirements. Similarly to TANF, however, SSI benefits decrease with household income.
In terms of incentives, both states and households benefit from moving adults and children with
disabilities from TANF to SSI. When this occurs, the SSI recipient is no longer part of the TANF
assistance unit. This leads to a decrease in TANF benefits, but SSI benefits are more generous, and
the SSI recipient’s income does not count in the TANF benefit calculation.11 The state also benefits
from the individual’s shift to SSI as the federal government funds the SSI program.12
Low-income families who become disconnected from TANF face an increased incentive to
enroll their members in SSI, as they no longer face a trade-off between decreased TANF and
increased SSI benefits. Nonetheless, applying for SSI is time consuming, and Deshpande and Li
(2019) document a spike between 2011 and 2014 in closures of Social Security Administration
(SSA) field offices, at which individuals can receive assistance in completing SSI applications. In
particular, SSA field offices closed in Kansas, Maine, and Michigan during that time. Increased
costs of SSI take-up in these states may prevent substitution toward SSI in the absence of TANF.
10Since SNAP benefits are a function of family size and income less several deductions, TANF receipt may decrease
SNAP benefit amounts in some cases. Nonetheless, TANF benefit receipt does not affect SNAP benefit amounts among
very-low-income families that receive the maximum SNAP benefit.
11The maximum monthly federal SSI benefit for an individual was $674 as of January 2009 (Social Security
Administration 2009). This is larger than the maximum TANF benefit for a three-person family as of July 2009 in each
of the analysis states (Urban Institute 2020).
12Most states provide small supplements to SSI benefits using their own funds.
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Finally, stricter time-limit policy effects on earnings may lead to changes in tax benefits among
TANF-vulnerable individuals. In particular, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable
tax credit targeted at low- and moderate-income households with children, serves as an earnings
subsidy. For virtually all workers who meet TANF income-eligibility requirements, the EITC
generates a work incentive by decreasing the marginal tax rate on earned income.

3.

Conceptual Framework for Time Limits and Access to
Financial Resources

In this section, I discuss how TANF labor-supply incentives may affect families’ access to financial resources, including implications of work requirements and time limits. First, suppose that
individuals only receive labor income. In each period, they face a trade-off between consumption
and leisure, as illustrated by the budget constraint, line segment 𝑎𝑏 in Panel (a) of Figure 1. Now,
suppose that TANF is available but that work is not required to receive benefits. Then, the budget
constraint becomes 𝑎𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑏. Individuals who do not work are guaranteed a consumption floor and
locate at point 𝑐. The vertical distance between points 𝑐 and 𝑑 represents the earned income
disregard, and the slope of line segment 𝑑𝑒 is the benefit reduction rate. In this case, individuals
who become disconnected from TANF face a negative income and a (weakly) negative substitution
effect that imply increases in labor supply.
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Figure 1: Static Model of Labor Supply
(a)

Consumption
b
e

g
d
c

a Leisure
f
Work Requirement
(b)

Consumption

Work Requirement
(c)

Leisure

Consumption

Work Requirement
Leisure
Static model of labor supply with and without TANF. Solid lines represent budget constraints, and
dashed lines represent indifference curves.

Next, suppose that individuals face a work requirement and must locate along line segment 𝑔𝑒
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to receive TANF benefits.13 The budget constraint is now 𝑎 𝑓 𝑔𝑒𝑏. If the work requirement binds,
then it is unclear whether individuals will increase or decrease their labor supply in the absence of
TANF. For example, an individual with preferences represented by the dashed indifference curves
in Panel (b) of Figure 1 decreases labor supply when TANF becomes unavailable, while another
individual with preferences represented by the indifference curves in Panel (c) of Figure 1 increases
labor supply under the same constraints.
In addition, in the presence of fixed costs of supplying labor, extensive-margin labor supply may
change in the absence of TANF. Specifically, if the fixed cost of supplying labor is strictly positive
but less than line segment 𝑓 𝑔, then individuals may leave the labor force when TANF becomes
unavailable. Furthermore, individuals who qualify for SSI may begin to take up SSI benefits in
the absence of TANF. As SSI benefits are more generous than TANF benefits and eligibility is
not tied to work requirements, substitution toward SSI likely leads to decreases in labor supply.
Taken together, decreased TANF benefits, labor-supply responses, and changes in benefits from
other social-safety-net programs likely interact in a complicated way to affect individuals’ access
to financial resources.
Finally, TANF-vulnerable families who have not yet reached their time limits face an intertemporal trade-off between TANF participation in the current period and consumption and insurance
against negative income shocks in future periods. In existing work, authors find that welfare recipients are forward-looking and bank TANF benefits for the future.14 Nonetheless, individuals in
Arizona and Kansas, for example, who face relatively short time limits, may be limited in their
capacity to save TANF for future periods. Hence, while short time limits may decrease TANF use
by deeming families ineligible for benefits, behavioral TANF participation effects likely are more
muted in these states, where recipients retain limited ability to smooth consumption over time.
13For work activities other than employment, individuals would have to supply the same amount of labor to receive
TANF benefits but would only consume those TANF benefits in the absence of additional earnings.
14See Grogger (2002, 2003, 2004), Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003), Swann (2005), Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu
(2008), Mazzolari and Ragusa (2012), Chan (2013, 2017, 2018), and Low et al. (2018).
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4.

Data

I use two primary sources of data: 1) monthly state-level administrative data from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance, from January 2007
through December 2016, (Office of Family Assistance, Administration for Children and Families,
United States Department of Health and Human Services 2020) and 2) annual household-level
survey data from the ACS from 2007 through 2016 (Ruggles et al. 2020). The administrative data
document each state’s number of adult TANF recipients by month and are not subject to reporting
issues that plague household survey data. Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2015) document severe
underreporting of safety-net benefits in household surveys, and Meyer and Wu (2018) show that
such underreporting can lead to substantial underestimates of the effects of TANF on poverty. The
administrative data exhibit some problems, however. During the sample period, a number of states,
including California and Maine, began to provide token payments to working individuals in an
effort to satisfy the federal work requirement. Specifically, states can provide token payments to
individuals who leave the TANF caseload for employment, in order to boost state work-participation
rates and ensure federal funding. But when states introduce or eliminate these token payments, the
sizes of their TANF caseloads can change substantially, making the administrative data reported by
these states a poor measure of trends in traditional TANF participation. For example, after Maine
instated a $15 food-benefit-payment program in 2012, the state’s reported number of adult TANF
recipients nearly tripled (Office of Family Assistance, Administration for Children and Families,
United States Department of Health and Human Services 2020). This created a spike in the data
that does not reflect a change in traditional TANF use.15
The ACS data come from a state-representative survey of about three million households and
document individuals’ demographics and economic outcomes, including TANF benefits within
the past year.16 Fortunately, changes in TANF participation due to token payments do not appear
15In conversations with me, employees at Delaware’s Health and Social Services, Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health
and Family Services, and Vermont’s Agency of Human Services confirmed programming glitches or reporting errors
in their states’ TANF data as reported on the website of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of Family Assistance. I drop Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio, and Vermont in analyses using administrative data because
of changes in token payment policies and TANF reporting errors. Results are robust to including these states in the
analyses and can be found in the online appendix.
16ACS respondents are asked to report “any public assistance or welfare payments from the state or local welfare
office” within the past year (Ruggles et al. 2020). This measure includes both TANF and General Assistance (GA)
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to materialize in the ACS data, probably because many states provided these payments in the
form of food benefits, which survey respondents are unlikely to report as welfare income. After
establishing that stricter time-limit policies affect TANF participation, I use these data to study
access to financial resources as proxied by labor supply, income, and participation in other safetynet programs. In the ACS, I observe households’ SNAP and SSI participation during the past year
and individuals’ work during the past week and annual income from various sources.17 I do not
observe SNAP benefits or other federal and state taxes and subsidies, such as the EITC, directly
but impute these measures using households’ demographic information, SNAP parameters (Food
and Nutrition Service, United States Department of Agriculture 2019a), and the National Bureau
of Economic Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM program (Feenberg 2017a). More specifically, among
households that report SNAP participation, I use their family sizes, income, and housing costs,
among other demographics, to impute annual benefit amounts. Similarly, TAXSIM simulates
individuals’ annual state and federal taxes, including EITC benefits.18 I then use imputed SNAP
benefits and taxes, combined with reported total income, to calculate what I refer to as “total
resources”: total individual posttax income plus SNAP benefits.19
For analyses of outcomes other than TANF participation, I isolate the population most affected
by TANF policies by limiting the sample to female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children,
no spouse present, and less than a bachelor’s degree.20 Under these restrictions, I capture most
of the TANF-vulnerable population, as 86 percent of TANF recipients are female, 86 percent
are single, and less than five percent have more than 12 years of education (Office of Family
Assistance, Administration for Children and Families, United States Department of Health and
Human Services 2020). There are about 335,000 women in the restricted sample. Table 4 displays
summary statistics from 2007 through 2009, a period before any state changed its time limit, and
benefits, but given the extremely small size of the GA program (Schott and Hill 2015), it should be a nearly perfect
measure of reported TANF benefits. Because I do not observe the respondent’s interview month, I code outcomes
during the past year as having occurred during the survey year.
17While work during the past week may be an imperfect measure of employment, data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) suggest that nearly all full-time employees are at work during a given week (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
United States Department of Labor 2018).
18I do not observe EITC participation but assume that eligible taxpayers take up the credit, as over 78 percent of
EITC-eligible single filers had taken up the EITC as of 2009 (Jones 2014).
19Details of both the SNAP and tax imputation procedures can be found in the online appendix.
20I restrict the sample to women with less than $80,000 in total resources to remove outliers from the data. This
reduces the sample size by 1 percent. Results in which I include women with $80,000 or more in total resources in the
analyses are similar.
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notes statistical differences between outcomes in each analysis state and the control region, which
consists of all remaining U.S. states except California, Illinois, Missouri, Oregon, and Rhode
Island, for reasons explained in Section 2. Table 4 confirms that there are high rates of program
participation within the sample: 8 percent of women in the control region report TANF use within
a given year, with 40 percent reporting SNAP participation. Program participation is especially
high in Maine, where 24 percent of women receive TANF; this is more than 15 times higher than
the adult TANF participation rate within the U.S. more broadly. In conjunction with high rates
of program participation, women have low income levels. In the control region, average total
resources are $24,899 (2010 dollars), and this measure ranges from around $23,500 to $26,000
across Arizona, Kansas, Maine, and Michigan. These low income levels are in spite of relatively
high labor-force participation rates. Some 71 percent of women in the control region and 70 to 76
percent of women across the analysis states reported working during the past week.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for ACS Target Sample
Age
White
Black
Hispanic
Kids
Kids <5
<High school
High school
Some college
TANF
SNAP
SSI
Employed
TANF income
SNAP benefits
SSI income
Earnings
EITC
Total resources
Observations
Representative of

Arizona
35.55**
(0.1816)
0.42***
(0.0112)
0.06***
(0.0054)
0.29***
(0.0106)
2.14***
(0.0254)
0.47
(0.0162)
0.17***
(0.0015)
0.29***
(0.0105)
0.49
(0.0113)
0.07*
(0.0059)
0.37**
(0.3730)
0.02***
(0.0029)
0.72
(0.0102)
256
(36)
1,496
(59)
114***
(21)
20,069***
(381)
1,700***
(40)
25,876***
(334)
2,762
320,802

Kansas
33.61***
(0.3119)
0.67***
(0.0188)
0.14***
(0.0146)
0.07***
(0.0719)
2.03
(0.0419)
0.56***
(0.0317)
0.16
(0.0150)
0.35
(0.0189)
0.49
(0.0195)
0.12**
(0.0135)
0.35*
(0.0192)
0.02
(0.0059)
0.76***
(0.0167)
288
(43)
1,432
(108)
173
(44)
19,080
(591)
2,280***
(78)
25,931**
(492)
1,068
142,747

Maine
35.41
(0.4577)
0.93***
(0.0148)
0.02***
(0.0090)
0.00***
(0.0014)
1.79***
(0.0490)
0.37**
(0.0323)
0.08***
(0.0173)
0.42***
(0.0284)
0.50
(0.0287)
0.24***
(0.0258)
0.53***
(0.0285)
0.04
(0.0093)
0.71
(0.0264)
715***
(96)
1,559
(123)
315
(73)
16,159***
(877)
1,881
(105)
23,502*
(725)
523
69,899

Michigan
35.51**
(0.1555)
0.60***
(0.0093)
0.31
(0.0089)
0.03***
(0.0036)
2.00
(0.0204)
0.42**
(0.0125)
0.14***
(0.0068)
0.33**
(0.0086)
0.53***
(0.0093)
0.14***
(0.0063)
0.50***
(0.0093)
0.03
(0.0031)
0.70*
(0.0085)
459***
(28)
2,032***
(53)
203
(21)
17,812**
(312)
1,871
(49)
25,379*
(255)
4,524
559,813

Control
35.15
(0.0322)
0.48
(0.0019)
0.31
(0.0018)
0.10
(0.0012)
1.97
(0.0041)
0.45
(0.0028)
0.17
(0.0015)
0.35
(0.0019)
0.48
(0.0019)
0.08
(0.0011)
0.40
(0.3979)
0.03
(0.0007)
0.71
(0.0018)
260
(5)
1,581
(10)
207
(5)
18,514
(64)
1,855
(7)
24,899
(55)
97,090
11,973,679

Summary statistics for female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children, no spouse present,
and less than a bachelor’s degree. “TANF,” “SNAP,” and “SSI” are indicators for household TANF,
SNAP, and SSI use within the past year, respectively. “Employed” is an indicator for work during
the past week. Income measures are annual, and “Total resources” denotes posttax cash and nearcash income. Data was retrieved from ACS years 2007 through 2009 using household weights.
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*) levels. Statistical significance is relative to the control region.
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Sample demographics vary across analysis states. For instance, while Kansas, Maine, and
Michigan exhibit large proportions of white individuals, Arizona has a large Hispanic population.
Additionally, women in Arizona, Kansas, Michigan, and the control region have at least 2.0 children
on average, while women in Maine have 1.8 children on average. Women in Maine also tend to
have fewer children younger than five years old than do women in the other analysis states and the
control region.
Given the sample demographics, income, program participation, and employment should be
good indicators of access to financial resources among these women. The women likely do not own
large sums of assets, and because they have low income levels on average, even small changes in
income may affect their standards of living. Additionally, the high rates of program participation
within the sample suggest that safety-net benefits play an important role in determining such living
conditions.

5.

TANF Participation

5.1.

Empirical Strategy

Using both the administrative and ACS data, I first study each analysis state separately so that I
can observe heterogeneous effects across state policy environments. I then estimate specifications
in which I pool analysis states into a single treated unit to obtain an average estimated treatment
effect.
I begin by estimating synthetic control models of TANF participation using the administrative
data (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). The synthetic
control method allows state-specific characteristics to vary over time. This is particularly important
when studying the effects of welfare time limits, for the descriptive evidence documented in Section
2 suggests that analysis states changed their time limits in response to the Great Recession’s effects
on their economies. If this is true, then welfare participation in analysis states likely would have
increased disproportionately in the absence of their policy changes, as more individuals would
have qualified for TANF benefits. In this case, failing to control for time-varying state-specific
characteristics leads one to underestimate the effects of stricter time-limit policies on welfare
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participation. By allowing state-specific characteristics to vary over time, the synthetic control
method obtains the causal effects of stricter time-limit policies on TANF participation as long as
the synthetic control unit, a weighted average of the control states, provides a good approximation
of the treated state’s TANF participation trajectory in the absence of treatment.
I estimate the following synthetic control model for each analysis state separately:
(2)

𝑌𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑠 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑠𝑡 𝜙 + 𝜖 𝑠𝑡 ,

where 𝑌𝑠𝑡 is the number of adult TANF recipients per 100 adults (Population Division, United States
Census Bureau 2020) in states 𝑠 during month 𝑡. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 is an indicator for the state policy
change. Specifically, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 changes from 0 to 1 in the treatment region during the month in
which the state first changed its time-limit policy and stays “turned on” throughout the remainder
of the sample period. 𝛿𝑡 is a vector of unobserved common factors, and 𝜇 𝑠 is a vector of unknown
factor loadings. 𝜃 𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state characteristics, including the state’s unemployment rate
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor 2020), inflation-adjusted minimum
wage (Office of Communications, Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor
2020), TANF program parameters (Urban Institute 2020), and an indicator for transitional SNAP
benefits (Food and Nutrition Service, United States Department of Agriculture 2019b).21. I also
control for the state’s annual revenues less expenditures (United States Census Burea 2020) and
number of Social Security Administration field offices (Social Security Administration 2017), both
relative to the size of its adult population. 𝜖 𝑠𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest
and captures the difference between the treatment state and the synthetic control unit during each
posttreatment period, the causal effect of time limits on TANF use.22
I then extend the original synthetic control approach to a setting with multiple treated units,
pooling the four analysis states into a single affected unit (Dube and Zipperer 2015; Kreif et al. 2016;
Dickert-Conlin, Elder, and Teltser 2019). To do so, I rescale time into months relative to the policy
change and randomly assign a synthetic policy change month to each control state. To create a
21The state TANF program parameters include the maximum TANF benefit and maximum income for TANF
eligibility, as well as indicators for whether the state requires a job search at the time of TANF application and whether
failure to meet work requirements can result in loss of benefits on the first offense.
22When estimating Equation (2), I average lagged TANF participation values over periods of three pretreatment
months to avoid model overfit. Hence, each post-treatment time period consists of three consecutive months.
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balanced panel, I limit the sample to observations that occurred up to 45 months before and up to
61 months after the (synthetic) policy change. I then estimate Equation (2).
ˆ measuring the average
To compare results across states, I calculate the mean of the elements of 𝛽,
˜ While the
estimated treatment effect during the posttreatment period. Denote this measure as 𝛽.
˜ I measure the probability that
synthetic control method does not produce standard errors on 𝛽,
sampling variation drives treatment effects using placebo tests (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003;
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). When the magnitude of the actual average treatment
effect is larger than that of nearly any placebo treatment during the posttreatment period, the
probability that sampling variation drives treatment effects likely is small. To take into account
placebo estimates with poor pretreatment fit, I display figures of the distribution of the ratio of postto pretreatment root-mean-squared prediction error (RMSPE) (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
2010). If the actual analysis state exhibits good pretreatment fit and a large estimated effect size,
then its RMSPE ratio will lie in the right tail of the distribution, indicating that obtaining an RMSPE
ratio as large would be a low probability event had the treatment been randomly assigned within
the data.
The monthly administrative data contain many lags of the TANF participation measure, which
are used in the matching process and generally lead to a small RMSPE during the pretreatment
period. The annual ACS data, however, do not contain many lags of the dependent variable
and therefore are not as well suited to estimate Equation (2).23 Because of this, I also estimate
difference-in-differences models of TANF participation. The difference-in-differences models rely
on the assumption of common trends between the treatment and control regions that would not have
changed during the posttreatment period, had the analysis state not changed its time-limit policy.
I estimate the following difference-in-differences model using the administrative data:
(3)

𝑌𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑠𝑡 𝜙 + 𝜖 𝑠𝑡 ,

where 𝑌𝑠𝑡 is the number of adult TANF recipients per 100 adults in state 𝑠 during month 𝑡, as in
Equation (2). 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 is again an indicator for the state policy change that is a “1” in the
treatment region during the posttreatment period. 𝜇 𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are state and month fixed effects,
23Synthetic control figures using the ACS data can be found in the online appendix.
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respectively. 𝜃 𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state characteristics. 𝜖 𝑠𝑡 is the error term. I cluster standard errors at
the state level.
I estimate a similar difference-in-differences model using the ACS data:
(4)

𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑠𝑡 𝜙 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 Γ + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 ,

where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a scaled indicator of TANF participation that equals 100 if individual 𝑖 in state 𝑠
participated in TANF during year 𝑡. (This scaling makes 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 comparable to 𝑌𝑠𝑡 from Equation [3].)
Similar to Equation (3), 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑡 is an indicator for the state policy change, 𝜇 𝑠 represents state
fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 represents year fixed effects, and 𝜃 𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state characteristics. 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a
vector of individual characteristics.24 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error term. I again cluster standard errors at the
state level.25

5.2.

Results

Figure 2 shows the estimated effect of stricter time-limit policies on monthly adult TANF receipt
using the administrative data. (Results using Maine’s administrative data are in the online appendix,
for reasons discussed in Section 4.) In the upper-left panel of Figure 2, the solid line shows the
number of adult TANF recipients per 100 adult residents of Arizona by month. The number of
adult TANF recipients per 100 in Arizona hovers around 0.4 before Arizona first shortens its time
limit in 2010. After the policy change, the ratio decreases to less than 0.3 and continues to decrease
to less than 0.1 by 2016. TANF participation in Arizona and its synthetic control group track
each other closely before the policy change and diverge immediately thereafter. After this initial
divergence, the vertical distance between Arizona and its synthetic control group remains relatively
˜ the
constant, despite the gradual phase-in of Arizona’s 12-month time limit. Table 5 reports 𝛽,
average treatment effect over the posttreatment period. 𝛽˜ equals –0.198, which constitutes a 49
percent decrease from the baseline mean.
24Individual characteristics include age, race, number of children, educational attainment, and the inflation-adjusted
maximum refundable EITC benefit by state and family size (Feenberg 2017b).
25When I estimate pooled specifications using the ACS data, I limit the sample period to observations up to three
years before and up to four years after the (synthetic) policy change to create a balanced panel.

21

2016

AZ Frequency
5
10
15
2008

2012

2008

2012

2012

2016

0

2016

5
10
15
Post/Pre-RMSPE

20

MI

0

MI Treatment Effect
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4

0
2008

20

KS

MI Frequency
5
10
15

2016

5
10
15
Post/Pre-RMSPE

0

KS Treatment Effect
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
2012

MI Recipients/100
.2 .4 .6 .8

2008

0

2016
KS Frequency
5
10
15

2012

KS Recipients/100
0 .2 .4 .6 .8

2008

AZ

0

AZ Treatment Effect
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4

AZ Recipients/100
0 .2 .4 .6 .8

Figure 2: Synthetic Control Estimates of TANF Participation
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Synthetic control models using administrative data. The left column displays adults per 100
receiving TANF within each month in analysis states (solid) and their synthetic control groups
(dashed). The middle column displays placebo tests for estimated treatment effects of stricter
time-limit policies in analysis states. The thick black line represents the analysis state, and the
thin gray lines represent control states. The right column displays ratios of post- to pretreatment
RMSPE of estimated effects and placebo tests.
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Table 5: Effects of Stricter Time Limits on Scaled TANF Participation
Data
Method
Arizona

Admin
SCM
-0.198**
{0.0263}
[0.403]
-0.168**
{0.0263}
[0.514]

Admin
DID
-0.196***
(0.0250)
[0.403]
-0.236***
(0.0280)
[0.514]

ACS
ACS Target
DID
DID
-0.081*
-2.244***
(0.0441)
(0.4692)
[0.971]
[7.291]
Kansas
-0.321*** -2.514***
(0.0429)
(0.3791)
[1.221]
[11.506]
Maine
-0.586*** -6.747***
(0.0481)
(0.4800)
[2.663]
[23.663]
Michigan
-0.241
-0.304*** -0.307*** -3.430***
{0.4474} (0.0553)
(0.0887)
(0.7650)
[0.600]
[0.600]
[1.723]
[13.830]
Pooled
-0.213** -0.227*** -0.187**
-2.593***
{0.0263} (0.0376)
(0.0892)
(0.6050)
[0.514]
[0.514]
[1.593]
[11.667]
Estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on TANF participation. Columns “Admin SCM”
and “Admin DID” report the effect on the state’s number of adult TANF recipients per 100 adults
using the administrative data. Column “Admin SCM” contains synthetic control estimates. The
ranking of the analysis state’s post- to pretreatment RMSPE ratio, relative to those of the placebo
treatments, is listed in curly braces. Column “Admin DID” contains difference-in-differences
estimates. Columns “ACS DID” and “ACS Target DID” report difference-in-differences estimates
of the effects on the percentage of individuals reporting TANF use within the past year, using ACS
data. Column “ACS Target DID” restricts the sample to female heads of household aged 18 to 54
with children, no spouse present, and less than a bachelor’s degree. “Pooled” lists estimates from
specifications in which I pool analysis states. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
listed in parentheses. For each state, pretreatment means through June 2010 are listed in brackets
in Columns “Admin SCM” and “Admin DID,” and pretreatment means through 2009 are listed
in brackets in Columns “ACS DID” and “ACS Target DID.” For the pooled analysis, pretreatment
means include all pretreatment observations in the balanced panel. Asterisks denote significance
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

The upper-middle panel of Figure 2 presents placebo-treatment effects. A thin gray line
represents each estimated placebo-treatment effect, and the thick black line represents the estimated
actual treatment effect, which is simply the vertical distance between Arizona and its synthetic
control unit in the upper-left panel of Figure 2. The estimated actual treatment effect is more
negative than that of nearly any of the estimated placebo-treatment effects, which implies that
Arizona’s estimated treatment effect is not simply driven by sampling variation.
23

The upper-right panel of Figure 2 displays the distribution of the ratios of post- to pretreatment
RMSPE across states. Arizona’s post- to pretreatment RMSPE ratio is striking: the posttreatment
RMSPE is nearly 20 times as large as the pretreatment RMSPE, a greater ratio than that of any
control state. Thus, if the time-limit policy change was randomly assigned within the data, the
probability of obtaining a post- to pretreatment RMSPE ratio as large as Arizona’s is 1/38 =
0.0263. Taken together, evidence suggests that Arizona’s stricter time-limit policies caused large
and statistically significant decreases in adult TANF receipt.
The middle-left column of Figure 2 shows the estimated effect of stricter time-limit policies
in Kansas. The number of adult TANF recipients per 100 adults in Kansas remains at around
0.5 to 0.6 before Kansas first shortens its time limit in 2011. Then, the number of adult TANF
recipients per 100 decreases to less than 0.4 and continues to decrease to less than 0.2 by 2016. The
TANF participation trajectories of Kansas and its synthetic control group track closely until the
policy change, at which time the groups’ trajectories diverge. Similar to Arizona, Kansas’s initial
time-limit policy change in 2011 appears to drive the majority of the effect on TANF participation,
despite the state’s gradual time-limit phase-in. 𝛽˜ equals –0.168, which constitutes a 33 percent
decrease relative to the baseline mean. The middle-center placebo test panel shows that Kansas’s
estimated treatment effect is more negative than that of nearly any estimated placebo treatment.
Additionally, Kansas’s post- to pretreatment RMSPE ratio is greater than that of any control state.
Thus, similar to Arizona, Kansas’s stricter time limits led to large and statistically significant
decreases in adult TANF receipt.
Next, the lower-left panel of Figure 2 shows the estimated effect in Michigan. Michigan’s
pretreatment TANF participation trajectory does not match that of its synthetic control group as
well as those in Arizona and Kansas, which implies that 𝛽˜ could be inconsistent. Still, when
Michigan begins to enforce its time-limit policy in 2011, Michigan and its synthetic control’s
TANF participation series diverge. As reported in Table 5, 𝛽˜ equals –0.241, which constitutes a
40 percent decrease relative to the baseline mean, and this effect appears to be immediate. The
placebo-treatment graph shows that the estimated actual treatment effect is more negative than
that of any placebo-treatment in most posttreatment periods. The lower-right panel of Figure 2,
however, shows that 16 control states have a larger post- to pre-RMSPE ratio than Michigan. Given
Michigan’s relatively large treatment effect, the imperfect fit of Michigan’s synthetic control group
24

during the pretreatment period likely drives the low RMSPE ratio.
The remaining columns of Table 5 present difference-in-differences estimates of time-limit
effects on TANF participation. Estimates generated using the administrative data tend to be larger
in magnitude but are otherwise similar to the synthetic control estimates, which suggests that the
difference-in-differences common-trends assumption is reasonable. Consistent with results from the
administrative data, all difference-in-differences estimates using the annual ACS data are negative,
and most are statistically significant at conventional levels. The statistically significant pooled
estimate for all adults implies that stricter time-limit policies decrease annual TANF participation by
12 percent. This effect is practically large but considerably smaller than the statistically significant
pooled estimate from the estimated effect using the monthly administrative data, which implies
that stricter time limits decrease monthly TANF use by 44 percent. This suggests that stricter time
limits may have increased the speed of flows onto and off of the TANF caseload but could also be
attributed to differences across datasets.
Estimates within the target subsample are much larger in magnitude than those among all
adults. In the pooled analysis, stricter time limits decrease annual TANF participation within
the target group by a statistically significant 2.6 percentage points, or 22 percent. The effect-size
discrepancy between all adults and TANF-vulnerable women is unsurprising, given that many
adults are unaffected by TANF policies.

5.3.

Robustness

I test the robustness of results to alternative specifications and include results in the online appendix.
First, one may be concerned that models of TANF participation violate the difference-in-differences
common trends assumption, given evidence that analysis states changed their time limits in response
to the Great Recession’s effects on their economies. Because of this, I supplement results from
difference-in-differences models using the ACS data with results from weighted difference-indifferences models (Severnini 2014; Spreen 2018; Arkhangelsky et al. 2019; Dickert-Conlin,
Elder, and Teltser 2019). In doing so, I aggregate the data to the state level and use all pretreatment
values of the TANF participation measure to obtain the synthetic control weight vector. I then
disaggregate the data and use the synthetic control weights to estimate Equation (4). Results for all
adults are quite similar to those from the baseline difference-in-differences approach. The pooled
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weighted difference-in-differences estimate (coefficient of –0.214, SE = 0.0730) is slightly smaller
in magnitude than the pooled traditional difference-in-differences estimate but is still negative and
statistically significant.
I also estimate weighted difference-in-differences models using alternate strategies to obtain
the synthetic control weight vector. Because there are not many pretreatment values of the TANF
participation measure, I estimate models in which I extend the pretreatment period to begin in
2003. Effects are generally similar under this specification; the pooled coefficient for all adults
(coefficient of –0.310, SE = 0.1147) remains negative and statistically significant. Additionally,
I estimate models in which I use the average of the lagged TANF participation measure over
the pretreatment period, along with covariates, to obtain the synthetic control weight vector as
suggested by Kaul et al. (2018). These results are, again, generally consistent with the traditional
difference-in-differences estimates; the pooled coefficient for all adults (coefficient of –0.153, SE
= 0.0983) is negative but statistically insignificant.
Additionally, it is possible that anticipatory effects of time limits bias results, as in some states
policy changes were announced months before they were enacted. I therefore use the administrative
data to estimate both synthetic control and difference-in-differences models in which the treatment
period begins during the month in which the policy change was first announced. Results from these
specifications are nearly identical to those in the main analyses. The pooled estimates using both
the synthetic control (coefficient of –0.269) and difference-in-differences (coefficient of –0.222, SE
= 0.0361) methods are very similar to those found in Table 5.
Finally, to address concerns that results may be driven by changes in unobserved state TANF
policies that are unrelated to time limits, I estimate Equations (2), (3), and (4) without controlling
for time-varying state and individual characteristics. Results from these specifications are again
quite similar to those found in Table 5.

6.

Access to Financial Resources

Given the dramatic decreases in TANF participation shown in Section 5, I now investigate possible
implications on access to financial resources via effects on labor supply, income, and participation
in other safety-net programs. To do so, I restrict my attention to the ACS subsample of single prime26

age female heads of household with children and low levels of education and estimate Equation (4),
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the outcome of interest for individual 𝑖 in state 𝑠 during year 𝑡.

6.1.

Results

Table 6 presents estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on annual household TANF, SNAP,
and SSI participation and individual work within the past week. (Note that estimates in column
“TANF” of Table 6 are simply the estimates in column “ACS Target DID” in Table 5 divided
by 100.) Table 6 indicates that stricter time limits are associated with large decreases in SNAP
participation. All coefficients are negative, and most are statistically significant at conventional
levels. The statistically significant pooled estimate suggests that stricter time limits decrease annual
SNAP participation by 6 percent, and the effect size is largest in Maine, which experienced the
largest decrease in TANF participation. While point estimates for SNAP participation exceed those
for TANF participation, I cannot rule out larger effects of stricter time-limit policies on TANF use
than on SNAP use. Decreases in SNAP participation are consistent with loss of categorical SNAP
eligibility as individuals become disconnected from TANF.
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Table 6: Program Participation and Employment Outcomes among Targeted Individuals
TANF
SNAP
SSI
Employed
Arizona
-0.022*** -0.023** -0.010*** 0.010**
(0.0047)
(0.0115)
(0.0028)
(0.0043)
[0.073]
[0.373]
[0.017]
[0.716]
Kansas
-0.022*** -0.047*** -0.007***
-0.001
(0.0038)
(0.0088)
(0.0015)
(0.0030)
[0.115]
[0.354]
[0.025]
[0.764]
Maine
-0.067*** -0.085***
0.005*
0.027***
(0.0048)
(0.0119)
(0.0025)
(0.0059)
[0.237]
[0.529]
[0.042]
[0.713]
Michigan -0.034*** -0.043** 0.014*** -0.031***
(0.0076)
(0.0160)
(0.0038)
(0.0059)
[0.138]
[0.500]
[0.032]
[0.698]
Pooled
-0.026*** -0.029**
-0.000
-0.009
(0.0061)
(0.0128)
(0.0059)
(0.0099)
[0.117]
[0.451]
[0.022]
[0.713]
Difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on annual household TANF,
SNAP, and SSI use and work within the past week among female heads of household aged 18 to 54
with children, no spouse present, and less than a bachelor’s degree using ACS data. The category
“Pooled” lists estimates from specifications in which I pool analysis states. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and listed in parentheses. For each state, pretreatment means through
2009 are listed in brackets. For the pooled analysis, pretreatment means include all pretreatment
observations in the balanced panel. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*) levels.

While I interpret the effects of stricter time limits on SSI participation with caution because of
changes in the costs of obtaining SSI that were unrelated to TANF policies, I find a statistically
significant increase in SSI use in Michigan and a marginally significant increase in Maine. The SSI
increase in Michigan is especially large; the statistically significant coefficient of 0.014 implies that
stricter TANF time limits are associated with a 44 percent increase in SSI use. Negative SSI effects
in Arizona and Kansas likely are a function of the Social Security Administration office closures
that occurred around those states during the sample period.
Next, I turn to effects of stricter time limits on employment. The statistically insignificant pooled
estimate of –0.009 suggests that stricter time limits have virtually no effect on extensive margin
employment but masks substantial heterogeneity across analysis states. While extensive margin
employment increases by a statistically significant 2.7 percentage points in Maine, stricter time
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limits have virtually no effect on employment in Arizona and Kansas and decrease employment
by a statistically significant 3.1 percentage points in Michigan. I discuss possible channels for
heterogeneous employment effects in the next section.
Table 7 presents estimates of the effects of stricter time-limit policies on annual household TANF
income, SNAP benefits, and SSI income and individual earned income, EITC benefits, and total
resources—posttax income plus SNAP benefits. Unsurprisingly, the effects on TANF benefits are
all negative and tend to be statistically significant at conventional levels. The statistically significant
pooled coefficient indicates that stricter time-limit policies decrease annual TANF benefits by $113,
a 30 percent decrease from the baseline mean.
Table 7: Income Outcomes among Targeted Individuals
TANF
SNAP
SSI
Earnings
EITC
Total
Arizona
-112*** 134*** -70***
-412
51**
-194
(21)
(46)
(26)
(275)
(20)
(232)
[256]
[1,496]
[114]
[20,069] [1,700] [25,877]
Kansas
-22
-217*** -82***
-377**
35*** -419***
(13)
(33)
(13)
(155)
(13)
(137)
[288]
[1,433]
[173]
[19,080] [2,280] [25,931]
Maine
-295***
-61
9
1,183*** -229***
433*
(17)
(44)
(19)
(263)
(24)
(239)
[715]
[1,559]
[315]
[16,159] [1,881] [23,503]
Michigan -132*** -149*** 112*** -583***
19
-656***
(25)
(52)
(34)
(185)
(34)
(167)
[459]
[2,032]
[203]
[17,812] [1,871] [25,379]
Pooled
-113***
-40
1
-508**
34
-540***
(25)
(87)
(48)
(191)
(36)
(137)
[376]
[1,869]
[148]
[18,515] [1,910] [25,623]
Difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on annual household TANF
income, SNAP benefits, and SSI income and individual earned income, EITC benefits, and total
resources among female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children, no spouse present,
and less than a bachelor’s degree, using ACS data. The category “Pooled” lists estimates from
specifications in which I pool analysis states. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and
listed in parentheses. For each state, pretreatment means through 2009 are listed in brackets. For the
pooled analysis, pretreatment means include all pretreatment observations in the balanced panel.
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

Estimated effects on SNAP and SSI benefits also are generally consistent with estimated effects
on SNAP and SSI participation shown in Table 6. SNAP benefit coefficients are negative in all states
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but Arizona. The statistically insignificant pooled estimate, -40, suggests that stricter time limits
decrease imputed annual SNAP income by 2 percent. Average SSI benefits increase by a statistically
significant 55 percent in Michigan, consistent with its large increases in SSI participation.
Turning to earnings, the statistically significant pooled estimate suggests that stricter time
limits decrease annual earnings by $508, 3 percent of the baseline mean, but earnings effects vary
across states, as with the employment effects documented in Table 6. While there is no detectable
earnings effect in Arizona, there are statistically significant earnings effects in the other analysis
states. Earnings decrease by 2 and 3 percent in Kansas and Michigan, respectively, and increase by
7 percent in Maine. Earnings increases in Maine are consistent with increases in employment but,
given their size, probably also are driven by increases in intensive-margin labor supply. Changes
in earnings do not tend to have practically large effects on income through imputed EITC benefits.
The pooled EITC estimate, 34, is quite small and statistically insignificant.
Finally, while there is no detectable effect of stricter time-limit policies on income after accounting for taxes and SNAP benefits in Arizona, effects are statistically significant at conventional
levels in Kansas and Michigan, where time limits decrease total resources by 2 and 3 percent,
respectively. Maine, where effects are marginally significant, is the only state in which increased
earnings offset decreases in TANF and SNAP benefits. Maine’s extensive-margin employment
increases likely drive these increases in earnings, at least to some extent.

6.2.

Robustness

I test the robustness of results to various sample restrictions and alternative specifications.26 First,
I test whether results are robust to including women aged 15 to 17 and 55 to 59 in the ACS target
sample. Including these younger and older women changes results very little. I then test whether
restricting the sample to high school dropouts changes results. This sample restriction greatly
reduces sample size and increases standard errors while increasing TANF participation effect sizes.
Nonetheless, estimates using this sample are generally consistent with baseline estimates. Next, I
estimate weighted difference-in-differences models of all financial resource access outcomes, using
lagged TANF participation to generate the vector of synthetic control weights. While some of
the weighted difference-in-differences results lack the statistical power of the baseline estimates,
26Results available upon request.
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coefficients generally are similar across specifications. I then estimate specifications in which I do
not control for time-varying state and individual characteristics. Results are again similar to the
baseline estimates in Tables 6 and 7.
In addition, I test whether demographic changes over the sample period drive the TANF
participation effects that I find within the target sample. First, I test whether stricter time limits
induce women to migrate out of the analysis states, on the theory that less-generous TANF policies
provide an incentive for low-income individuals to migrate to states with more-generous programs.
I do not, however, find strong evidence that migration into other states occurs in practice. I also
test whether stricter time limits lead to changes in family structure. Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes
(2006) explain that after their families reach their time limits, children may continue to receive
TANF benefits by leaving the household to live with grandparents or other friends or relatives.
Nonetheless, I do not find strong evidence that this occurs in practice.
Finally, I estimate the effects of California’s stricter time limit for adults only on outcomes
related to the access of financial resources. As expected, I find no effect on TANF participation,
as children remain eligible for benefits. I do find evidence, however, that TANF income decreases
by 9 percent because of the policy change (coefficient of -74, SE = 30), which is consistent with
decreased benefits that are due to the removal of parents from the caseload. Decreases in TANF
benefits corroborate estimated effects on TANF income from the main analyses.

7.

Why Do Effects Vary across States?

There are several possible channels through which labor supply effects could operate to cause the
observed differences across analysis states. Differences in TANF work requirements offer one such
possibility. As discussed in Section 3, in the absence of binding work requirements, loss of TANF
benefits implies increases in labor supply, but when work requirements bind, the theoretical effect
of TANF disconnection on labor supply is unclear. Table 2 shows that all analysis states but Arizona
implement 30-hour work requirements. Because of this, I study baseline differences in the usual
number of hours worked for targeted women who receive TANF relative to women who do not
receive TANF. To test for bunching around the work requirement, Table 8 shows the proportion of
women in each of these groups who usually work 30 to 32 hours per week, conditional on working,
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between 2007 and 2009. In each analysis state, the proportion of TANF recipients who work 30
to 32 hours per week exceeds the proportion of nonrecipients who work 30 to 32 hours. This
evidence suggests that work requirements bind for at least some TANF recipients. The difference
is smallest and statistically insignificant in Arizona, where 15 percent of working TANF recipients
usually work 30 to 32 hours but only 8 percent of nonrecipients do so. Still, I fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the difference between the proportion of TANF recipients and the proportion
of nonrecipients working 30 to 32 hours per week is the same across analysis states, and therefore
I cannot conclude that differences in work requirements drive heterogeneous employment effects
across states.
Table 8: Proportion Working 30 to 32 Hours per Week in Target Group, Conditional on Employment
TANF No TANF Difference
Arizona
0.153
0.076
0.077
(0.0467) (0.0067)
{0.5822}
111
2,123
2,234
Kansas
0.232
0.076
0.156
(0.0716) (0.0113)
{0.0998}
66
857
923
Maine
0.221
0.106
0.115
(0.0715) (0.0201)
{0.0725}
58
357
415
Michigan
0.206
0.095
0.111
(0.0292) (0.0064)
{0.0308}
332
3,330
3,662
Proportion of working female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children, no spouse present,
and less than a bachelor’s degree, who usually work 30 to 32 hours per week. Data was retrieved
from ACS years 2007 through 2009 using household weights. Standard deviations and 𝑝-values
are listed in parentheses and curly braces, respectively, above the number of observations.

Another possibility is that in all states, TANF-vulnerable women increased their labor supply,
but that women were unable to find work in states with high unemployment rates. During and
after the Great Recession, unemployment rates were high across most states, but Michigan, for
example, had a particularly high unemployment rate, 13.7 percent as of 2009. Thus, it is plausible
that women in Michigan exhibit similar labor market responses to time limits as women in Maine,
for instance, but are unable to secure employment because of insufficient labor demand. To study
this possibility, I estimate effects of Missouri’s transition from a 60-month to a 45-month time limit
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in 2016 in the online appendix. Specifically, I use the ACS data, extending the period of study
through 2018, to estimate the effect of Missouri’s time-limit policy change on financial resource
access outcomes among target-sample mothers. In 2016, Missouri’s unemployment rate was only
4.6 percent, so increases in employment would suggest that macroeconomic conditions affect the
ability of TANF-vulnerable individuals to work more as TANF generosity decreases. In line with
this idea, I find a statistically significant 2.3 percentage point decrease in TANF participation (SE
= 0.0051) and a statistically significant 4.7 percentage point increase in employment (SE = 0.0040)
among women in Missouri. The employment effect in Missouri is even larger than that in Maine
and implies that, to some extent, labor demand drives employment responses to stricter time-limit
policies.
Differences in TANF policies at baseline suggest that TANF caseload demographics also may
play an important role in determining employment effects. Table 2 shows that as of 2009, Maine’s
TANF program had no time limit, the highest maximum income for eligibility, a relatively generous
maximum TANF benefit, and the most generous work exemptions for parents of very young children.
Combined with the relatively high levels of TANF participation in Maine shown in Table 4, this
suggests that TANF-vulnerable mothers in Maine likely had higher labor market potential than
their counterparts in the other analysis states. Tables 3 and 4 provide support for this hypothesis, as
target sample mothers from Maine are more similar to welfare recipients as of 1990 than to welfare
recipients as of 2009, on several dimensions. Thus, differences in caseload demographics and labor
market potential also may drive heterogeneous employment effects of time limit policies.
Finally, the negative total resources effects among target-sample mothers in Kansas and Michigan shown in Table 7 raise the question of how mothers compensate for forgone TANF and earned
income. Increases in SSI participation offer one possible channel for this. I find statistically significant increases in SSI income only in Michigan, and increased SSI income does not compensate
for forgone earnings and income from other transfer programs. Another possibility is that mothers
compensate for decreases in income by relying on transfers from family members or friends. Table
9 displays the proportion of targeted women in analysis states who lived in households in which
there was another adult, by employment status and TANF participation before and after their states
changed their time-limit policies. Table 9 shows that women who are not employed and do not
receive TANF tend to be more likely to live with another adult than any other demographic group.
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Furthermore, among women who do not work and do not receive TANF, the proportion living
with another adult increases in all of the analysis states after these states shorten their time limits.
Kansas and Michigan, where earnings effects are negative and statistically significant, experience
the largest increases in the proportion of women living with another adult. Such changes in living
arrangements suggest that women who are removed from TANF and do not work may rely on
income supports from other household members.
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Before Time Limit Change
After Time Limit Change
Employed Employed Not Employed Not Employed
Employed Employed Not Employed Not Employed
No TANF
TANF
No TANF
TANF
No TANF
TANF
No TANF
TANF
Arizona
0.315
0.258
0.395
0.310
0.357
0.323
0.415
0.468
(0.012)
(0.046)
(0.026)
(0.057)
(0.009)
(0.034)
(0.018)
(0.051)
2,117
121
468
93
4,771
288
1,223
156
Kansas
0.274
0.235
0.351
0.158
0.303
0.218
0.414
0.212
(0.017)
(0.054)
(0.044)
(0.061)
(0.015)
(0.046)
(0.040)
(0.095)
1,146
91
181
46
1,547
117
293
52
Maine
0.312
0.310
0.379
0.253
0.365
0.324
0.396
0.243
(0.024)
(0.066)
(0.057)
(0.063)
(0.030)
(0.077)
(0.062)
(0.092)
582
95
120
83
481
59
116
54
Michigan
0.318
0.230
0.306
0.227
0.314
0.214
0.348
0.258
(0.009)
(0.022)
(0.021)
(0.028)
(0.008)
(0.023)
(0.017)
(0.033)
4,440
517
764
303
5,500
472
1,326
326
Proportion of female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children, no spouse present, and less than a bachelor’s degree, who live with
at least one other adult. Data was retrieved from ACS years 2007 through 2016 using household weights. Standard deviations are listed
in parentheses above the number of observations.

Table 9: Proportion of Targeted Women with Another Adult in the Household

8.

Conclusion

In the wake of the Great Recession, states implemented stand-alone TANF policies that created
retroactive time limits that became effective immediately. In some cases, these recent time-limit
policies were far stricter than time limits that were imposed during welfare reform. Using both
administrative and ACS data, I find that the introduction of stricter time-limit policies causes large
decreases in TANF participation. When I limit my sample to a group of individuals likely affected
by TANF policies, I find that stricter time limits decrease annual household TANF participation
by 22 percent. Because TANF interacts with other aspects of the social safety net, I also study the
effects of stricter time limits on participation in and income from other transfer programs. I find that
stricter time-limit policies decrease annual household SNAP participation by 6 percent. Finally,
given TANF labor-supply incentives, I study the effects of stricter time-limit policies on labor
supply and find statistically and economically significant increases in employment and earnings
only in Maine. Evidence suggests that macroeconomic conditions and the labor market potential of
TANF recipients play large roles in determining labor-supply effects of decreased TANF generosity.
Even under very different circumstances, the TANF, SNAP, and SSI participation results that
I find are consistent with those of existing literature that estimates the effects of welfare reform.
Still, effects on TANF participation are larger than those of much of the previous literature.27 This
likely is due to the retroactive nature of the TANF time-limit policy changes that I study. I show
that the recent time-limit policy changes led to large, immediate decreases in TANF participation
that, in large part, probably reflected the mechanical effects of losing TANF eligibility. Turning to
participation in other safety-net programs, we see that interactions between TANF and SNAP and
SSI have not changed over this time, and SNAP and SSI participation results are similar to those of
the previous literature.
Nevertheless, under the environment of the 2010s, labor-supply estimates are quite different
from those of existing literature. Research using welfare reform to identify the effects of time limits
on labor supply finds that time limits unambiguously increase extensive-margin employment.28 I do
27See Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003), Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008), Chan (2013, 2018), and Low et
al. (2018).
28See Grogger (2002), Fang and Keane (2004), Swann (2005), Farrell et al. (2008), Fang and Silverman (2009),
Mazzolari and Ragusa (2012), Chan (2013, 2017), and Low et al. (2018).
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not find this with the 2010s reforms; my findings suggest that TANF work requirements may cause
women to work more when they receive TANF than when they are ineligible and no longer required
to work. Binding work requirements, decreases in labor demand, and increases in employment
among those on the welfare caseload likely lead to contrasting employment and earnings effects
between the 1990s and 2010s.
In any event, I study only the short-run effects of TANF time-limit policies. Stricter time limits
also may have long-run effects on TANF participation and access to financial resources through
both changes in the size and composition of future TANF caseloads and intergenerational income
and dependence effects (Hartley, Lamarche, and Ziliak 2017). Future research may address whether
the stricter time-limit policies that I study have such long-run effects.
To the extent that income, program participation, and labor supply proxy for access to financial resources, the results that I find imply that policymakers ought to consider macroeconomic
conditions and TANF caseload demographics before altering TANF policies such as time limits.
While stricter TANF time limits may lead to substantial cost savings for both state and federal
governments through decreased TANF and SNAP participation, such changes may substantially
reduce the living standards of low-income families. Results suggest that in states without generous
TANF programs, welfare recipients exhibit little labor market potential, especially during times
of widespread unemployment. Removing such individuals from TANF likely would inhibit their
access to financial resources and decrease their overall well-being.
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APPENDIX
1.

SNAP Benefits Imputation Procedure

I impute Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits for households reporting
SNAP participation. In order to do this, I make the following assumptions:
• Households take up the standard and shelter cost deductions but no other deductions.
• Households use the standard utility allowance for their shelter deductions.
• Maximum allotments and standard utility allowance calculations in Alaska are slightly imperfect because of geographic data limitations and differences in benefit parameters across
regions.
• Monthly income and earnings equal annual income and earnings divided by 12.
• I impute property taxes based on the middle of property tax bins as reported in the American
Community Survey (ACS), with the maximum amount being $10,500.
• If a second mortgage payment is listed, I assume that it includes taxes and insurance.
• I assume that all utilities are included in reported rent payments, unless the ACS measure of
“gross rent” does not equal the ACS measure of rent.
• Households do not take up the homeless deduction.
• I take weighted averages to adjust fiscal year SNAP parameters for calendar years.

2.

Total Resources Imputation Procedure

I generate post-tax income using the TAXSIM program from the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER). Given data limitations, I must make some assumptions about individuals’ income
to calculate their taxes. Specifically, I make the following assumptions:
• All of the individual’s children in the household (and no others) are dependents.
1

• A child was younger than age 17 or 18 for the entire tax year if they were younger than that
age at the time of the survey.
• The individual does not receive tax benefits related to child-care expenses.
• The individual has no qualified dividends, no long-term capital gains or losses, no property
income besides a mortgage, and no mortgage interest. All investment income is in the form
of short-term capital gains or losses.
• The individual does not receive unemployment insurance benefits.
• I impute property taxes as in Section A1.
Using these assumptions and the income and demographic data in the ACS, I run NBER’s TAXSIM
to calculate state and local taxes and subtract these from the individual’s total income.

2

3.

Tables and Figures

Table A1: Effects of Stricter Time Limits on Scaled TANF Participation, Including Additional
Control States
Method
Arizona

SCM
DID
–0.223** –0.202**
{0.0233} (0.0239)
[0.403]
[0.403]
Kansas
–0.172* –0.237***
{0.0930} (0.0253)
[0.514]
[0.514]
Michigan –0.259 –0.299***
{0.3721} (0.0494)
[0.600]
[0.600]
Pooled
–0.118* –0.239***
{0.0698} (0.0328)
[0.514]
[0.514]
Estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on the state’s number of adult Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) recipients per 100 adults using the administrative data and including
Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio, and Vermont as control states. Column “SCM” contains synthetic
control estimates. The ranking of the analysis state’s post- to pretreatment root mean square
prediction error (RMSPE) ratio, relative to those of the placebo treatments, is listed in curly braces.
Column “DID” contains difference-in-differences estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level and listed in parentheses. “Pooled” lists estimates from specifications in which I pool
analysis states. For each state, pretreatment means through June 2010 are listed in brackets. For the
pooled analysis, pretreatment means include all pretreatment observations in the balanced panel.
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

3

Table A2: Weighted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Stricter Time Limits on
Scaled TANF Participation
(1)
(2)
(3)
Arizona
–0.113**
–0.087
–0.256***
(0.0485)
(0.0766)
(0.0482)
[0.971]
[1.142]
[0.971]
Kansas
–0.247** –0.244*** –0.283**
(0.1021)
(0.0705)
(0.0886)
[1.221]
[1.337]
[1.221]
Maine
0.051
–0.218
–0.189***
(0.0942)
(0.1594)
(0.0325)
[2.663]
[2.594]
[2.663]
Michigan –0.275***
0.061
–0.145
(0.0627)
(0.0741)
(0.0776)
[1.723]
[1.717]
[1.723]
Pooled
–0.214*** –0.310***
–0.153
(0.0730)
(0.1147)
(0.0983)
[1.593]
[1.592]
[1.593]
Weighted difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on the percentage
of individuals reporting TANF use within the past year, using ACS data. Column (1) presents
baseline estimates. Column (2) includes years 2003 through 2016. Column (3) includes controls in
the synthetic control model. “Pooled” lists estimates from specifications in which I pool analysis
states. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and listed in parentheses. For each state,
pretreatment means through 2009 are listed in brackets. For the pooled analysis, pretreatment
means include all pretreatment observations in the balanced panel. Asterisks denote significance
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table A3: Effects of Stricter Time Limits on Scaled TANF Participation by Policy Announcement
Method
Arizona

SCM
DID
–0.182* –0.201***
{0.0526} (0.0258)
[0.406]
[0.406]
Kansas
–0.176* –0.232***
{0.0526} (0.0279)
[0.513]
[0.513]
Michigan –0.227 –0.232***
{0.4737} (0.0560)
[0.599]
[0.599]
Pooled
–0.269** –0.222***
{0.0263} (0.0361)
[0.517]
[0.517]
Estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on the state’s number of adult TANF recipients per
100 adults, using the administrative data for which the posttreatment period begins when the policy
change is announced. Column “SCM” contains synthetic control estimates. The ranking of the
analysis state’s post- to pretreatment RMSPE ratio, relative to those of the placebo treatments, is
listed in curly braces. Column “DID” contains difference-in-differences estimates. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level and listed in parentheses. “Pooled” lists estimates from specifications
in which I pool analysis states. For each state, pretreatment means through March 2010 are listed
in brackets. For the pooled analysis, pretreatment means include all pretreatment observations in
the balanced panel. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table A4: Effects of Stricter Time Limits on Scaled TANF Participation without Controls
Data
Method
Arizona

Admin
SCM
–0.199*
{0.0526}
[0.403]
–0.171**
{0.0263}
[0.514]

Admin
ACS
ACS Target
DID
DID
DID
–0.193*** –0.062** –0.2060***
(0.0181)
(0.0289)
(0.2635)
[0.403]
[0.971]
[7.291]
Kansas
–0.246*** –0.309*** –2.598***
(0.0202)
(0.0296)
(0.2663)
[0.514]
[1.221]
[11.506]
Maine
–0.567*** –6.249***
(0.0309)
(0.2903)
[2.663]
[23.663]
Michigan –0.242
–0.334*** –0.351*** –3.719***
{0.4474} (0.0202)
(0.0296)
(0.2681)
[0.600]
[0.600]
[1.723]
[13.830]
Pooled
–0.206** –0.242***
–0.207
–2.822***
{0.0263} (0.0376)
(0.1284)
(0.5910)
[0.514]
[0.514]
[1.593]
[11.667]
Estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on TANF participation without controlling for timevarying state and individual characteristics. Columns “Admin SCM” and “Admin DID” report the
effect on the state’s number of adult TANF recipients per 100 adults, using the administrative data.
Column “Admin SCM” contains synthetic control estimates. The ranking of the analysis state’s
post- to pretreatment RMSPE ratio, relative to those of the placebo treatments, is listed in curly
braces. Column “Admin DID” contains difference-in-differences estimates. Columns “ACS DID”
and “ACS Target DID” report difference-in-differences estimates of the effects on the percentage
of individuals reporting TANF use within the past year, using ACS data. Column “ACS Target
DID” restricts the sample to female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children, no spouse
present, and less than a bachelor’s degree. “Pooled” lists estimates from specifications in which I
pool analysis states. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and listed in parentheses. For
each state, pretreatment means through June 2010 are listed in brackets in columns “Admin SCM”
and “Admin DID,” and pretreatment means through 2009 are listed in brackets in columns “ACS
DID” and “ACS Target DID.” For the pooled analysis, pretreatment means include all pretreatment
observations in the balanced panel. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*) levels.
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7

TANF

SNAP

SSI

Employed

TANF
SNAP
SSI
EITC
Earnings
Total
income benefits income
benefits
California
0.001
–0.014
–0.013***
–0.006
–74**
89
–122***
–571*
–189*** –974***
(0.0071)
(0.0183)
(0.0038)
(0.0048)
(30)
(62)
(36)
(328)
(30)
(269)
[0.162]
[0.290]
[0.025]
[0.689]
[852]
[1,174]
[227]
[20,544] [1,533] [26,587]
Missouri –0.023*** –0.076*** –0.013*** 0.047***
–11
–298*** –112*** 1,488***
54**
1,244***
(0.0051)
(0.0126)
(0.0023)
(0.0040)
(19)
(43)
(20)
(156)
(27)
(139)
[0.106]
[0.464]
[0.031]
[0.715]
[242]
[725]
[219]
[17,506] [1,830] [23,863]
Difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of stricter time limits on annual household TANF use, SNAP use, Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) use, TANF income, SNAP benefits, and SSI income and individual work within the past week, earned income, Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) benefits, and total resources among female heads of household aged 18 to 54 with children, no spouse present,
and less than a bachelor’s degree in California and Missouri, using ACS data. For Missouri, the period of study extends through 2018.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level and listed in parentheses. For each state, pretreatment means through 2009 are listed in
brackets. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

Table A5: Effects of Stricter Time Limits on Financial Resource Access Outcomes in California and Missouri
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Figure A1: Synthetic Control Estimates of TANF Participation in Maine
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Synthetic control model using administrative data. Adults per 100 receiving TANF within each
month in Maine (solid) and its synthetic control group (dashed).
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Figure A2: Synthetic Control Estimates of TANF Participation in Arizona Using ACS Data
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Synthetic control model using ACS data. Percent of individuals reporting TANF use within the
past year in Arizona (solid) and its synthetic control group (dashed).
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Figure A3: Synthetic Control Estimates of TANF Participation in Kansas Using ACS Data
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Synthetic control model using ACS data. Percent of individuals reporting TANF use within the
past year in Kansas (solid) and its synthetic control group (dashed).
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Figure A4: Synthetic Control Estimates of TANF Participation in Maine Using ACS Data
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Synthetic control model using ACS data. Percent of individuals reporting TANF use within the
past year in Maine (solid) and its synthetic control group (dashed).
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Figure A5: Synthetic Control Estimates of TANF Participation in Michigan Using ACS Data
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Synthetic control model using ACS data. Percent of individuals reporting TANF use within the
past year in Michigan (solid) and its synthetic control group (dashed).
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